Jean-Luc Nancy’s tiny book The Fall of Sleep (Fordham, 2009) is simply a pleasure to read. When I read it, I just read it, no note-taking, no intentions. But one passage stuck out so much that I feel compelled to make a note about it. Here’s the passage:
The thing in itself is nothing other than the thing itself, but withdrawn from any relation with a subject of its perception or with an agent of its manipulation. The thing, isolated from all manifestation, from all phenomenality, the sleeping thing at rest, sheltered from knowledge, techniques, and arts of all kinds, exempt from judgments and prospects. The thing not measured, not measurable, the thing concentrated in its indeterminate and non-appearing thingness. (p. 14)
By describing the thing in itself in terms of withdrawal from relations, Nancy’s remarks resemble a key feature of Graham Harman’s object-oriented philosophy: that real objects are non-relational. Nancy’s sleeping thing and Harman’s dormant objects have a lot in common. Nancy and Harman are both Heideggerian, so these connections are not particularly surprising. What really interests me about this passage is that it shows the similarity between Nancy and Harman while also exemplifying an important difference between them: Nancy considers withdrawal indeterminate, whereas Harman’s objects are still determinate even in their withdrawal. For Harman, a chair in itself is still a chair, not merely a non-appearing whatever. Furthermore, Harman is clearly a pluralist about objects, whereas Nancy’s reference to “the thing” in the singular indicates that he is more ambiguous about the singular/plural difference (as his Being Singular Plural indicates). I’m not sure whose side I take. They’re like my children: I love them both equally.